Business Planning as Pedagogy: Language and Control in a Changing Institutional Field

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Language and power are central to an understanding of control. This paper uses the work of Pierre Bourdieu to argue that an enriched view of power, in the form of symbolic violence, is central. We examine the pedagogical function business plans played in the provincial museums and cultural heritage sites of Alberta, Canada. The struggle to name and legitimate practices occurs in the business planning process, excluding some knowledges and practices and teaching and utilizing other knowledges and ways of viewing the organization. We show that control involves both redirecting work and changing the identity of producers, in particular, how they understand their work through the construction of markets, consumers, and products. This process works by changing the capital, in its multiple forms—symbolic, cultural, political and economic—in an organizational and institutional field.[•]

Business planning has traditionally been thought of as a mechanism to implement direct and explicit controls through formally established goals and, as such, has been promoted as a central tenet of good management (Ansoff, 1965; Anthony, 1965). From this perspective, business planning is a rational and neutral instrument that can encourage managers and employees to conform to organizational expectations. The decision process and the outcome of business planning is seen as a powerful and important force for change and control (Porter, 1980). Further, the business planning process is regarded as one of neutral transcription that works primarily by informing those in the organization. Planning failures are then seen to result from politics, inadequate process, inflexibility, and, often, lack of commitment (Quinn, 1980; Miller and Friesen, 1984). So, at the same time, planning has also been criticized for generating rigidity and other unintended consequences and for not delivering the control desired by managerialists (Wildavsky, 1974; Van Gunsteren, 1976; Gray, 1986; Mintzberg, 1994).

There has been considerable research on the role of controls in strategic change, with an increasing emphasis on the significance of language, ritual, and culture. Following Wittgenstein, language has been seen as an agreed way of speaking and carrying out activities, rather than a reflection of reality (Astley and Zammuto, 1992; Mauws and Phillips, 1995). For example, Berry et al. (1985), Dent (1991), and Munro (1995) have examined the interpenetration of language, the social and the technical components of accounting and budgeting systems in organizations undergoing change. Similarly, the literature on the control of work has increasingly examined "the complex ways in which we, as human beings, form our subjectivity and reproduce/change the labour process" (Knights and Willmott, 1990: 39). As Alvesson and Deetz (1996: 192) argued, "objects for management control are decreasingly labor power and behavior and increasingly the mindpower and subjectivities of employees." Such research suggests we take power, language, and subjectivity more seriously when examining controls such as business planning.

Bourdieu's work stresses what is at stake in control and change. Business planning should be seen as a profound

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mechanism of control, a pedagogic practice that can fundamentally change organizational identities by changing what is at stake: the capital—in Bourdieu terms—of an organizational and institutional field. Like many other social theorists, Bourdieu sees power as central to understanding how control works in modern society and organizations. Bourdieu's understanding is closer to views of power and control that focus attention on the constitution of interests and the shaping of values (Lukes, 1974; Clegg, 1989). In this version, power can be at its most effective when there is no visible conflict (Foucault, 1980). While there is no doubt that control can be directly coercive (for example, by threatening people's jobs) and can be executed through organizational hierarchies, it is also important to understand how control works more subtly through language and the construction and use of knowledge. Regarding planning as coercive and hierarchical is incomplete; it also provides and sanctions legitimate forms of discourse and language and thus serves as a mechanism of knowledge that produces new understandings of the organization. As a form of pedagogy, business planning is not a neutral mechanism of transcription but, rather, has significant implications for the forms and amounts of capital within a field and for organizational identities. Business plans not only announce that change is coming, but it is through the activity of business planning that change actually occurs. In this paper, we argue that business planning is indeed "effective" in introducing change but that the process through which this occurs is more complex than much of the current literature suggests.

Our examination of the way in which Bourdieu's ideas can enrich institutional theory is illustrated by the Canadian government's reengineering efforts, which are similar to public sector efforts elsewhere (Pusey, 1991; Gore, 1993; Pollitt, 1993). We examine an episode of change in the Province of Alberta, focusing on the impact of business planning in the Cultural Facilities and Historical Resources Division (CFHR) of Alberta Community Development, a department of the provincial government. In addition to preserving the varied history of Alberta specifically and of Canada more generally, the CFHR division provides historical research and archaeological services and is a source of education and cultural identity. It is responsible for a total of 18 sites, including provincial archives, a world heritage site (designated by UNESCO) documenting Blackfoot history, several large museums, with collections ranging from dinosaur bones to carriages, a number of large and small cultural heritage sites documenting the early fur trade, immigrant settlements, oil sands, and other aspects of Alberta's history. Business plans, announced in the provincial treasurer's 1993 budget speech, were advocated as a way to control spending and to introduce "accountability" into provincial operations. The provincial government's initiatives involve units like the CFHR in forms of management that they either have not previously encountered or that appear to be significantly different in practice from management under previous governments. Business planning has introduced a vocabulary and method of managing alien to a sector that has understood its main rationale as the preservation and interpretation of the province's historical resources.

The paper proceeds by a series of paired theoretical and empirical sections. In the first section we introduce two central concepts from Bourdieu, field and capital, and show how these can enrich institutional theory. We then illustrate the value of both concepts by analyzing the activities of the CFHR as a field of restricted production, with its own processes of control. The third section discusses Bourdieu's concept of pedagogical practices to show how institutional processes of change are effected. This process is then illustrated by analyzing the introduction of business planning in CFHR in 1993–1994. The fourth section analyzes the reconstituted field of CFHR, a field that constructs the various organizations within it as small businesses with control effected through business planning and market forces. We thereby show how Bourdieu's concept of the field of large-scale production can enrich the ideas of isomorphism that are so important to institutional theory. In the process, we discuss the possibilities for strategic action and resistance. The final discussion points out some possible future developments and briefly discusses the wider effects of the changes we have identified.

BOURDIEU AND INSTITUTIONAL THEORY

Institutional theory provides a useful starting point for understanding the introduction of business planning in the CFHR. Although the term "control" is rarely used explicitly, institutional theory focuses on the ability of the institutional field to influence or control organizational functioning. Organizations are constructed through institutionalized practices and historical experiences that construct normative models of organizational legitimacy. As changes occur in the institutional rules that define legitimacy, organizations respond by voluntarily adopting recommended changes or by giving the appearance of having adopted changes in order to appear legitimate (Meyer and Rowan, 1991; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b). The desire to enhance organizational legitimacy and survival may prompt convergence or homogenization in organizational practices or structures. Institutional theory would suggest that government reforms prompted Alberta's museums and cultural sites to change and, to the extent that changes occurred, they were defensive responses to changing notions of what constitutes legitimate organizational practice. We illustrate how the work of Pierre Bourdieu can enhance institutional theory by addressing several neglected or problematic issues other scholars have identified: understanding change (e.g., Leblebici et al., 1991; Holm, 1995); issues of politics, conflict, and legitimacy (e.g., Powell, 1991; DiMaggio, 1991); and the identification of a field (e.g., Scott and Meyer, 1991). We do so by examining two central concepts from his work: field and capital.[1]

Fields. Institutional theorists familiar with Bourdieu's work have referred to the concept of organizational field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b). Defined as a "totality of relevant actors," it is "those organizations that, in the aggregate constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies and other organizations that produce similar services or products" (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b: 64–65). According to

1

Garnham and Williams (cited in Brubaker, 1985) and Wacquant (1993) warned of the dangers of appropriating theoretical concepts outside of the total theory. We are cognizant of this danger. There are a number of central and valuable concepts in Bourdieu's work that a paper of this length does not allow us to explore. For example, while Bourdieu's work (e.g., 1985) was concerned with extending Marx's concepts of class beyond property rights, we have not discussed class here. We feel that Bourdieu's concepts of field and capital were valuable enough to understanding the changes at the CFHR, however, that we risked the dangers of drawing on only part of his theory.

DiMaggio and Powell (1991b), the structure of a field is not determined a priori but is a matter of empirical investigation. Described as a "critical unit bridging the organizational and societal levels in the study of social and community change" (DiMaggio, 1986: 337), the concept of organizational field has provided a valuable addition to institutional analyses of organizational change (DiMaggio, 1991; Brint and Karabel, 1991).

For Bourdieu, fields are networks of social relations, structured systems of social positions within which struggles or maneuvers take place over resources, stakes, and access. Bourdieu (1990) described positions within fields as "positions of possibility," because they are not stable but reflect relations of power. These positions are always in flux. Further, fields are hierarchically distributed, depending on the kinds of capital, the number and types of positions in the field, and whether the field can influence issues in other fields (Jenkins, 1992; Bourdieu, 1993). In our study, historical and cultural institutions constitute a field in their own right. Within this field, positions are negotiated and created by the maneuverings of curators, historians, archaeologists, researchers, volunteers, and native and immigrant communities. This field is located in a hierarchically structured set of fields, one of which is the dominating field of the provincial government.

Capital. In considering how business planning may introduce change into a particular organizational field, we refer to Bourdieu's concept of capital, which has not received much attention in institutional theory but is central to his concept of a field. Fields are defined by different forms of capital at stake, be they cultural, symbolic, social, or economic, as exhibited, for example, in cultural goods, intellectual distinction, or social or economic class. Further, fields are characterized by an on-going struggle for capital (Wacquant, 1989b). Capital is not restricted to financial or monetary assets but can have other tangible and intangible nonmonetary forms. While capital may be economic, it may equally be cultural, as represented, for example, by education and expertise; or symbolic, as, for example, the capacity to define and legitimize cultural values. It may also be social, defined by access to and positioning in important networks. These types of capital have different degrees of liquidity (that is, the speed with which they may be transformed into other forms of capital); convertibility (the extent to which they may be exchanged for other forms of capital); and differing susceptibility to attrition (through loss, flight, or inflation) (McCall, 1992). Each capital is manifested in different currencies (networks, educational qualifications, manners, or physical objects, such as paintings). Capital is field-specific. Different forms of capital dominate and legitimate different fields. According to Bourdieu (1985: 724), "Capital . . . represents a power over the field (at a given moment). . . . The kinds of capital, like the aces in a game of cards, are powers that define the chances of profit in a particular field (in fact to each field, or sub-field there corresponds a particular kind of capital, which is current, as a power or stake, in that game)."

For Bourdieu, forms of capital and the structure of a field are interdependent. Actors are positioned in fields according to

the overall volume and relative combinations of capital available to them (Bourdieu, 1985). Capital also structures the possible strategies and actions available to actors. The ability of those within the field to define its boundaries, thereby determining the degree of autonomy of a field, is intimately related to capital. Thus, actors and capital are not pluralistically distributed in a field. Capital is also central to changes that occur within a field. For example, in the field of historic sites, the distribution of historians, educators, facility managers, publishers, local business people and communities, and professional associations will determine the capital. The relations between these actors is always in flux because the capital and positions with a field, and between fields, are continually being contested. If historians occupy a dominant position, capital will be cultural, as interpreted through professional values; if business communities dominate the field, economic capital (e.g., tourism or employment) would be more central.

Implications of Capital and Fields

Capital and field also have implications for organizational identities and practices. For Albert and Whetten (1985: 265), an adequate statement of organizational identity must satisfy a number of criteria: the essence of the organization (claimed central character), features that distinguish it from others (claimed distinctiveness), and features that exhibit sameness or continuity over time (claimed temporal continuity). Capital is central to these elements. It structures the relationships between producers, their "products" and "consumers." It defines the identity of "'producers," the way they understand and control organizational purpose and functioning, and how they understand their work through the orientation of the field and its products. The identity of producers and consumers in the field guides interpretations and actions and "provides a set of skills and a way of using and evaluating those skills that produce characteristic ways of doing things" (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991: 546). These identities, which we refer to as positional identities, result from the interaction between what Bourdieu calls the "habitus"—the deeply ingrained aspects of identity such as gender, race, ethnicity, and class that individuals bring into a field—and ideal-typical images of occupations (Barley, 1996). These identities are animated, however, through the naming and distribution of positions and capital within the field. Thus, the constitution of a field is of particular concern for members in a field.

The internally related concepts of field and capital also inform practices of management, evaluation and accountability, organizational positions, responsibilities, and functioning. They provide individuals with a vocabulary of motives and a sense of identity and generate values and prevailing concepts of organizational work and worth . In this sense, Bourdieu's work amplifies Friedland and Alford's (1991) notion of an institutional logic (see also Scott, 1987). Bourdieu (1985) emphasized that each field has its own logic, as different forms of capital tend to impose their own logic on a field.

Bourdieu's interrelated concepts of field and capital enrich institutional theory in several respects. First, they help iden-

tify what constitutes a field. Institutional theory has ad-
dressed this issue by making reference to shared cognitive
or normative frameworks or meaning systems (Scott, 1995),
symbolic and regulatory processes (Scott and Meyer, 1994),
or the nature and degree of interaction between participants
in a field (Scott, 1994). For DiMaggio and Powell (1991b), a
field is manifest by interactions among organizations in the
field, structures of domination and patterns of coalition, infor-
mation loads, and by a mutual awareness of being involved
in a common enterprise. For Bourdieu, the kind of capital
and the role it plays in defining and structuring the field
through positions is key. A field, therefore, is not the product
of normative regulations, an objective consensus, or the re-
sult of interactions. Although actors occupying similar posi-
tions in a field are probably more likely to develop similar
cognitive and normative frameworks (Fiol and Huff, 1992;
Scott, 1994), there may well be serious conflict between ac-
tors in the field (DiMaggio, 1991). Bourdieu's concept of field
is particularly important because it breaks with understand-
ings of organizational structures and relations based on con-
ventional charts. Thus, in figure 1, we locate the provincial
government in a separate, but hierarchically related field to
the various sites. While the figure may look like an organiza-
tional chart, we stress that the provincial government is a
dominating field, while the CFHR division and its elements
are *dominated* fields.

Second, the link between legitimacy and what is at stake in
an institution's survival is more clearly defined through Bour-
dieu's concepts, as are the political choices involved in
change. Bourdieu's notion of capital renders the concept of
legitimacy more meaningful by requiring us to examine what

**Figure 1. Position of Cultural Facilities and Historical Resources Division in provincial government of Al-
berta.***

* Names in upper-case letters represent dominating fields. Names in italics represent dominated fields.

is at stake in change and by prompting us to ask what role legitimacy plays in the constitution, preservation, and exchange (i.e., the control) of various forms of capital. In this respect, it explicitly recognizes the political dimensions of conflict and provides a means of "bringing society back in" to an analysis of organizational change (Friedland and Alford, 1991; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a). For example, institutional theory implies that organizations have a material substance that exists separately from organizational practices. Although organizations may be challenged, they may adopt changes and still continue to exist. Change alters the organization, but the organization could survive. Chameleon-like, an organization could adopt another appearance or structure if necessary. This interpretation derives from the distinction in institutional theory between the demands of the institutional environment and the technical, operating core, or task contingencies (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). Organizations may incorporate socially legitimated and rationalized elements into their formal structures but protect a technical core by loosely coupling operating practices from the institutional environment.

Bourdieu's concept of capital allows us to reassess these distinctions between the technical core and the environment. Although capital identifies a core, this is not equated with some essentialist technical core, or task contingencies. For Bourdieu, a practice that is deemed "technical" is one that has gained the status of being taken for granted.[2] It is technical because it is not challenged. The ability to claim a practice as taken for granted or technical is part of the cultural capital of a field. It is part of what those in the field are able to identify and define as natural and legitimate. For example, the body of knowledge that the curatorial profession recognizes as technical, the taken-for-granted element of being a curator, constitutes the cultural capital of the field. If that profession can no longer hold on to this body of knowledge, that is, if it becomes open to question, then the cultural capital of the field is lost (see also Abbott, 1988).

If an institution or organization is sufficiently challenged, that is, if the form or amount of capital shifts significantly, the institution would cease to exist in any meaningful sense. As Albert and Whetten (1985: 272) noted, a "central proposition in the identity literature is that loss of identity (in the sense of continuity over time) threatens the individual's health." Thus, even if a field were primarily identified by its physical capital, its bricks and mortar (e.g., a museum building), if the distribution of positions and capital could no longer be maintained, the bricks and mortar would become like a shell that is no longer occupied by the same entity. In losing symbolic, cultural, or economic capital, a field loses legitimacy and its autonomy to define its own criteria for the production and evaluation of its organizational identity, functions of management, and product. In losing its capital, a field loses its ability to define and control its own products, consumers, and the market in which its capital will be exchanged. Thus, Bourdieu allows us to look more specifically at how legitimacy is constructed and maintained and at the implications of its loss.

2

In this sense Bourdieu's understanding is not dissimilar from Meyer and Rowan's (1991) statement that impersonal techniques are rationalized myths and that technical procedures become taken for granted. Latour (1987) likewise discussed how technological innovations (and we would include organizational and managerial technologies) become taken for granted through social processes.

While some interpretations of institutional theory suggest that change is problematic (Donaldson, 1995), in Bourdieu's conception, change is part of the way fields work. Fields are always in flux or open to change because the capital of, and consequently positions in, the field are always being contested. There is continuous competition over the form and type of capital. Bourdieu (1993: 34) suggested that "the generative unifying principle of the 'system' is the struggle, with all the contradictions it engenders." For example, in the educational field what constitutes good education is continuously contested and will be viewed differently according to positions in the field. It is through struggle and negotiation over definitions that forms of dominant capital are transformed, translated, and exchanged. These struggles and negotiations can occur exclusively within a field, or they may be influenced by changes occurring in another field, especially in a dominant one.

In our research, museums and cultural sites constitute a field in which the positions available, the power between these positions, and the distribution of capital result from that field's specific history. At stake is the interpretation of what is "authentically" historical or cultural and what, therefore, deserves to be preserved, studied, and exhibited. For example, at one site there has been an ongoing debate between paving a road for visitors' convenience and improved attendance, and maintaining the authenticity of the site by keeping the dirt road. More generally, what is at stake is the repository of Alberta's collective history, the source of cultural and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1990). In this paper, we are interested in how the implementation of business planning affected the distribution of possible positions and the symbolic and cultural capital within the field.

METHODS

The research for this paper, which forms part of a longitudinal study on the introduction of business plans and performance measures into cultural and historical organizations, focuses on the period 1993, when the plans were introduced, to 1995. Our research resulted from our teaching a management course at the university for the provincial government and a request we made to participants to allow us to produce teaching cases for future courses. The assistant deputy minister (ADM) of the Department of Community Development initially provided access, and our plan to produce teaching cases soon shifted to a formal research agreement with the department. The means of access is always likely to affect research, and there is little doubt that senior managers liked the image of interacting with "business types from the university" and hoped this would enhance their credibility in government. At the same time, it was apparent to the ADM that we were not managerialist enthusiasts. We emphasized the voluntary nature of our interactions with people in the organization and presented our research not as describing the development and implementation of business planning and performance measurement in the Albertan government. Our role was that of a "peripheral member" (Adler and Adler, 1994), not only conducting formal interviews but also talking with insiders over coffee and beer, sharing the

occasional meal, and attending workshops and meetings about planning and performance measurement, although not participating in the actual work of the participants. Yet we also saw ourselves as critical researchers, examining shifting forms of control and domination, recognizing that facts cannot be isolated from some form of ideological inscription and that our research work required self-conscious criticism (Kincheloe and McLaren, 1994: 139–140).

Our research draws on a number of sources from four levels of government (see figure 1): the provincial government, including the Treasury, the Department of Community Development, the Cultural Facilities and Historical Resources Division (CFHR), and the individual historical sites themselves. We analyzed policy documents, including memos, business plans, planning documents, and letters collected at all four levels of government. We studied discourses that museums and cultural facilities have traditionally drawn on, as well as the literature on performance measures and business planning that is frequently cited by the provincial government. We also conducted 56 semistructured interviews involving all four levels of government. Each interview lasted between one and a half and two and a half hours. With three exceptions, in which there was only one author present, two authors conducted each interview. The interviews were taped with the permission of the respondents and were transcribed. Although we constantly worried about how the people interviewed tried to present themselves to us (they were assured that no one else in the organization would have access to the tapes or the transcripts), we are somewhat reassured by our processes of cross checking with the data we obtained from other methods, particularly observation. These interviews involved the individuals responsible for developing, implementing, and monitoring business plans and managing each site. The discussion was loosely structured to cover the people's background and experience in the department, their involvement in business planning, their attitudes toward management and administration, and a description of their job, its challenges and rewards. In some cases, the interview focused on specific issues, such as planning and control of one site or the interaction between a site and the local community.

An important initial aim was to construct a history of the introduction of business planning and performance indicators within the CFHR, and we began to conduct interviews, attend meetings, and collect information at this level. Interviews, observation, and analysis of archival records allows for the interpretation of meaning as experienced by the subjects (Moch and Fields, 1985). To understand changes at this level, however, we also needed to extend our observations to higher levels in government (e.g., the Department of Community Development and Treasury) and at the actual museums and historical sites. The sites vary considerably in the number of people employed, from one to three full-time employees at the smaller sites and museums to almost 100 at the larger sites. At each site, we interviewed the director, or manager (who frequently had been trained in a related profession—curator, historian, etc.) and those involved in business planning. Many of the people at the site and divi-

sion level had worked either in CFHR or in similar cultural facilities for most of their working lives. We also collected archival data and developed a historical perspective on the division and the sites (Moch and Fields, 1985).

The three researchers worked to practice epistemic reflexivity (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 36–47), that is, acknowledging and acting on a view of themselves as researchers who help to produce culture and theory as well as being a product of their own sociohistorical conditions (Pels, 1995). Being a member of a culturally and theoretically diverse team that included both genders facilitated self-analysis of the objects of the research and ourselves as objects. Bourdieu, however, insisted that researchers go beyond narcissistic reflexivity by requiring the analyst to recognize her or his own position in the intellectual field, to subject "the *position* of the observer to the same critical analysis as that of the constructed object at hand" (Barnard, 1990: 75). We actively discussed the parallels between our own experiences as workers in a publicly funded and increasingly managerialist university with those of the managers in the department and division. We cannot pretend to have fully examined our own position in the intellectual field, but we have begun the attempt (Townley, 1995, 1996; Cooper and Neu, 1996).

All three researchers worked iteratively through the collected material and reviewed transcribed interviews for common themes. Frequently, however, an interview or document would raise questions or appear to contradict material collected earlier or contradict the authors' preliminary understanding of the material being collected. These points of difficulty were important aspects of the research process for two reasons. First, they encouraged us to conduct further interviews and attend additional meetings and to use the techniques of "snowball sampling" (Goodman, 1961; Dawes, 1987), in which an original group of respondents suggests additional lines of inquiry, leading to additional respondents. Acceptance of this method reflects our understanding that neither the processes we were studying nor our study itself was linear but, rather, reflected the twists and turns that are normal in this type of research (Silverman, 1985). Second, we recognized the importance of coming to grips with these difficult points of contradiction (Calhoun, 1995). Bourdieu's work, in particular, his description of fields of restricted and large-scale production and the capital involved, proved useful in explaining the changes that we were identifying. For example, Bourdieu's work is useful in understanding why actors might appear contradictory, because they are often operating within or moving between several fields in which differential capital and positions are available.[3]

3
An important dimension of how this works comes from the concept of habitus, which for Bourdieu is a set of "internalized dispositions," that reside within individuals. They are learned through formal education, experience, and the inculcation that occurs as actors learn to negotiate social relations, to use language, and to recognize their context. Thus, the responses of individuals within fields reflects not only the positions and capital available within the field but also the habitus of the actors involved. While a more complete analysis of the introduction and effects of business planning would include an examination of the habitus of our subjects, this is beyond the scope of the current study.

Finally, as part of our research agreement, the authors presented their research to several seminars in the department. These presentations generated considerable debate and were, on several occasions, followed up in more private meetings. The department has reviewed several versions of this paper, suggested amendments, and finally agreed to the publication of the paper, without endorsing its arguments.

CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL SITES AS A FIELD OF RESTRICTED PRODUCTION

Because of the nature of their capital, cultural and historical organizations have constituted a field of restricted production (Bourdieu, 1989; Crowther, 1994). In such fields, economic capital plays a lesser role in the field's dynamics than does cultural capital. "Economic success is secondary to symbolic value, with competition for cultural capital in the form of recognition, reputation, and legitimacy" (Anheier, Gerhards, and Romo, 1995: 863). Drawing on Bourdieu, we came to view the CFHR as a field of restricted production under threat. While we present this field as a Weberian ideal type to amplify Bourdieu's concepts, the categories within this ideal type, for example, positional and organizational identity, and implicit notions of capital are extant within the museum literature, were repeatedly reinforced in our interviews, and helped us make sense of our research material.

Fields of restricted production are relatively autonomous, in that their orientation is primarily internal. This circularity is not accidental. It occurs because the field has the cultural capital to control its own internal processes and criteria, which in turn allows those working in the field to have greater autonomy over what constitutes their work. Following, we present how the control over the identification, convertibility, and currency of capital allows this to happen.

The logic of restricted production describes the management of museums and historical sites for a large part of the twentieth century (DiMaggio, 1991; Karp, 1992), even where there may be quite diverse museum practice (Sherman and Rogoff, 1994). In 1981, the National Museums of Canada defined museums this way: "museums collect, they preserve and study what they collect and they share both the collections and the knowledge derived therefrom for the instruction and self-enlightenment of an audience" (quoted in Weil, 1990: 45). This definition is very close to other widely held views of the work of museums. Weil (1990) cited a 1970s list describing the five basic responsibilities of every museum as being to collect, to conserve, to study, to interpret, and to exhibit. This list was used as a basis to evaluate museums throughout the 1970s and 1980s in both North America and Europe, although it has recently been reduced to "the order triad of preservation, truth and access," or to preserve, to study, and to communicate (Weil, 1990: 61). All five tasks focus primarily on the museums' responsibility to the object or artifact—the cultural capital of this restricted field. Museums' only responsibility outside the field, to the public, was to "interpret and exhibit." There is no mention of a responsibility to ensure that people attend. One site manager described the distance that once existed between museum staffs and those who visit museums: "When I started I asked how many visitors we had that summer and I was told basically, 'well I don't know. Who cares? If they come in, they come in.' Right?"

Cultural capital is reinforced by the museum's ability to define its organizational purpose internally. This purpose is articulated by museum staffs at museum association meetings and in the journals of museums, in other words, by mem-

bers positioned within the field. Museum staff relied on it when, in our interviews, they identified what distinguished museums from other sources of entertainment, for example, Disneyland. When a senior manager told us "we don't do phony," he was drawing on an assumed common understanding of the cultural capital of Alberta. This sense of institutional specificity and insularity provides the field with the ability to legitimize and monopolize the use of certain goods that embody cultural capital.

It is significant that many of those interviewed spoke of museums in a way that suggested they viewed museums as a separate field with a certain level of autonomy. As part of a field, the participants have the ability to draw boundaries and to define the "distinction" between true history and authentic culture, on one hand, and entertainment or amusement, on the other. Museums derive cultural capital from the preservation and interpretation of artifacts and sites that are viewed as unique and irreplaceable because the curators and historians say they are unique and irreplaceable. By "consecrating" these goods, they support the symbolic capital of those whose identities are sanctified in the preservation and interpretation process. This, in turn, augments the field's ability to maintain its symbolic and cultural capital. The curators, interpreters, and historians produce to their own specifications. They are able not only to consecrate the goods but, as educators and interpreters, they are also able to consecrate or define the appropriate consumers of those goods.

Another source of cultural capital within a field of restricted production is the positional identity of its producers. In this case, identities such as professional curator, researcher, interpreter, historian, archivist, or educator reside both in the organization and in a professional body of knowledge with its own rules for carrying out the type of work involved. These rules both legitimize the work done and help define people's positional identities. For example, some of those interviewed stressed the importance of self-generated performance measures: "We have professional performance measures. Archivists expect that work will be done in a certain way. You know, curators have certain internal professional standards, and so do programs, and so forth" (site manager). They also stressed the importance of educational credentials in a division that employs over thirty Ph.D.s: "It's interesting to be in an organization in government where a Ph.D. is considered to be a qualification and not a, not a detriment, yeah. And because we have the scholarly side to us, I mean you are supposed to depend that when you come to us what we tell you is true or as true as information is" (site manager). The credentials and self-regulation of professionals helped people in the division legitimize themselves and the validity of what they constituted as the province's authentic history—hallmarks of Bourdieu's description of a field of restricted production. Educational credentials and professional standards provide the cultural capital to allow curators, archivists, and researchers to judge their own work credibly and to have some local control over their work. Education enables the staff to determine the "truth" behind an artifact, historic site, or collection. Work is judged on the basis of the aesthetic criteria of historical and/or representational accuracy:

the ability to portray and preserve truthful knowledge in an exhibit, a paper, a collection, or an interpretive performance.

Both Bourdieu and our research materials suggest that accountability in such a field depends on the judgments of people within the field and thus reinforces the field's cultural capital. If, for some reason, an organization needs to justify or review its activities, it is likely to initiate program evaluation involving an assessment by someone from within the profession, for example, the International Council on Museums or the Canadian Museums Association. Museums themselves, together with the professional association, will limit the evaluation. This logic of evaluation suggests that accountability is defined by representational faithfulness or accuracy of the story or exhibit to the artifact or to the history.

Bourdieu argued that in a field of restricted production, good management preserves and generates cultural capital. For this field, good management ensures that the organization finds, categorizes, and preserves artifacts and cultures before they are lost or ravaged by time. Practically, this management process involves developing site, facility, and exhibition plans that establish the boundaries of acceptable activities: what can be collected, what can be exhibited, what can be told, even what can be sold or done at the site. These boundaries are based on professional interpretations of the necessities of history and culture. Such plans describe the theme or story line, time period, and type of collection of the site. They are typically extensive and detailed, documenting for each gallery or room the precise story line and the artifacts to be used or, in some cases, acquired. Thus, good management involves activities that conserve cultural capital by controlling both the consecration of goods and the creation and consecration of consumers for those goods. This means that the field is able to define and control the currency of its capital and need not be particularly concerned about the speed or ease with which it can convert its cultural capital into other forms of capital.

As in other fields of restricted production, the purpose of a site or museum has a social value or worthiness in itself. Its purpose does not lie in the value of the museum to external constituents and, indeed, is often defined by its distance from market demands. As a site manager indicated: "When I was hired on with the Alberta government I had this overwhelming sense of relief. Oh, great, I don't have to worry about making money and making my facility pay for itself the way I had to when I worked for [X] and they were looking at my museum and going, 'It is losing money now, it is losing money.' It was great, I was with the government. They understand that Museums Don't Make Money."

Although those we interviewed had typically trained and worked within the logic of restricted cultural production, by the time the majority of Alberta's museums and cultural sites were established in the 1980s or early 1990s, museums were already forced to market their activities in ways that fell outside this logic (Weil, 1990). From the mid 1980s, the division had used estimates of the economic impact of museums to encourage legislators to fund new sites and

investments. Divisional managers reported representing them as tourist attractions and sources of local economic development when speaking to provincial members of the legislature and members of the business community. New museums were not, therefore, advocated as sites of collections, preservation, and interpretation. One site manager describes that period: "We were making partnerships with the private sector. We would make deals with local businesses. We would provide them with services. We were having local business people and local professional people on our advisory boards and we were doing a lot of community partnering and a lot of community consulting. Ah, we thought we were successful for that." Such episodes should be understood, however, as examples of loose coupling and symbolic ceremonies, in that divisional managers were very conscious and deliberate in their use of economic advantage, the perceived capital of the political field, to convince legislators to fund the expansion of the division and gain the political support of local businesses. At the same time, divisional managers continued to focus their organizational efforts on collection, preservation, and interpretation of artifacts. Members in the field thus continued to value, articulate, and preserve the traditional museum culture associated with the logic of a field of restricted production. This managing of legitimacy to external constituencies, however, was transformed by the introduction of business planning.

SUBTLE CONTROL THROUGH BUSINESS PLANNING AND PEDAGOGY

As part of its 1993 mandate to eliminate its deficit, and reflecting Alberta's strand of conservative populism, the Alberta provincial government initiated major changes, popularly referred to as the "Klein Revolution" (Lisac, 1995). Underlying these reforms was a growing discourse about the restructuring of the global economy and the need to cut governmental deficits. The Albertan government had two interconnected policies: a reduction in program spending from $12 billion dollars to $9.85 billion over four years and an approach to management that has variously been called the "new public management" (Hood, 1995), "reinventing government" (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993), and the "performance-control model" (Mintzberg, 1996).[4] A central component of the reorganization was that government departments would be required to generate three-year business plans, including goals, outcomes, and performance measures.

Business planning is one of the most pervasive and taken-for-granted mechanisms for organizational control (Galbraith, 1977). As noted earlier, its rationale draws implicitly or explicitly on a control model of power. The metaphor of control suggests a "descending" analysis of power, that is, of power that is held (or possessed) by an institution, organization, group, or individual and may be used to control the actions of other (less powerful) institutions, organizations, groups, or individuals. This model also informs analyses that stress the unintended consequences of business planning (e.g., Dirsmith, Jablonsky, and Luzi, 1980; Brunsson and Olsen, 1993). These observations about a possessive, descending view of power typically underlie common sense

[4]
The government has actually cut program expenditures as planned, and since 1995, the province no longer has an annual deficit and is aggressively reducing its accumulated debt.

analyses of administrative reforms. In this view, which Lukes (1974) referred to as a one-dimensional view of power, conflict and differing interests and values are at the forefront. In all these presentations, business plans are seen as representing the transcription of rational decision processes. The mode of transcription of the plans remains largely unaddressed, a neutral mechanism to a desired end.

More complete views of power focus on its role in constituting interests and shaping values (Lukes, 1974; Clegg, 1989). Power need not involve coercion or conflict but may involve reconfiguring positional and organizational identities, vocabularies, and values. Bourdieu introduced the notion of "symbolic violence" to understand social reproduction through cultural mechanisms: "symbolic violence, to put it as tersely and simply as possible, is the *violence which is exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity*" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 167). As Jenkins (1992: 105) argued, "the mainstay of the exercise of symbolic violence is 'pedagogic action' . . . [and this] involves the exclusion of ideas as unthinkable, as well as their positive inculcation."

Bourdieu (1977) used the term symbolic violence to indicate that although force or power is involved in change, the mechanisms of control are not always explicit and do not necessarily involve conscious and direct strategic action. It is not necessary for force to be physical or completely visible to be effective. Thus, Bourdieu (1977: 196) referred to symbolic violence as the "gentle, hidden form which violence takes when overt violence is impossible." Indeed, when the mechanisms of change are hidden or misrecognized, the impact on an organization is sometimes more substantial than when the direction and impetus to change is completely recognized and consciously planned and directed. Political changes, i.e., changes that involve a field's positions and capital, are often misrecognized because they appear to be purely technical exercises.

We consider business planning as pedagogic action, in which the format of the plans simultaneously excludes and inculcates. Business planning excludes certain ideas as unthinkable, such as not being businesslike, efficient, customer-oriented, and revenue-seeking, while also promoting a vision of the organization as a business, subject to instrumental reasoning. The process of business planning also acts as a form of learning by doing. Business planning has significant implications for the capital of a field and, with this, positional and organizational identity. What is valued in the field shifts, in our case from representing a historian's view of authentic culture and artifacts to a concern with what will generate revenues and visitors. Economic capital becomes more important, and cultural capital remains valued to the extent that it can be transformed into economic capital. Further, business plans not only announce that change is coming, but it is through the activity of business planning itself—the introduction of new vocabularies such as revenue generation, products, and customers—that change occurs.

To understand this presentation of business planning we must consider Bourdieu's understanding of power and its relationship with knowledge (Wacquant, 1989a). For Bour-

dieu, as for other social theorists, knowledge is not neutral but is intimately tied to the operation of power (Foucault, 1980). In particular, Bourdieu (1985) identified the power to nominate or the monopoly of legitimate naming. He noted that "the social world can be uttered and constructed in different ways. It may be practically perceived, uttered, constructed, according to different principles of vision and division" (Bourdieu, 1985: 726). Bourdieu's understanding of the power effects of language thus goes beyond an analysis that, for example, identifies the power effects of metaphor, a deep structure of language, or interpretive schemata (Pondy, 1978; Moch and Fields, 1985). "Knowledge of the social world and, more precisely, the categories that make it possible, are the stakes, par excellence, of political struggle, the inextricably theoretical and practical struggle for the power to conserve or transform the social world by conserving or transforming the categories through which it is perceived. . . . This work of categorization, i.e., of making explicit and of classification, is performed incessantly, at every moment of ordinary existence, in the struggles in which agents clash over the meaning of the social world and their position within it" (Bourdieu, 1985: 729). Through the production and imposition of legitimate meaning, actors constitute a particular field. As a result, "the legitimate mode of perception is such an important prize at stake in social struggles" (Bourdieu, 1985: 730). The monopoly of legitimate naming is important because "it is not the relative value of the work that determines the value of the name, but the institutionalized value of the title that can be used as a means of defending or maintaining the value of the work" (Bourdieu, 1985: 733). Naming is also powerful because it displaces existing names, identities, and understandings that ground organizational actors, making it possible for them to maneuver comfortably within a field. Every field is characterized by a struggle to monopolize legitimate naming.

The exercise of control that occurs through naming, categorizing, and regularizing is a pedagogic practice (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977; Bourdieu, 1991). The power of pedagogy lies in its ability to name things in a way that diminishes the possibility of resisting because the process appears neutral and normal—"technical." Although pedagogy may be imported or imposed externally, it almost certainly actively involves members of the field. Bourdieu (1977, 1990) commented that pedagogy is more effective when there appears to be active involvement than when "lessons" appear to be given in complete and structured form; lessons that appear to allow creativity and participation are much more difficult to recognize as an imposed lesson and then to resist than those that are visibly imposed. Passive knowledge of the language or a discourse such as business planning alone is insufficient, for using or speaking the language is part of the process of pedagogy—"it is not sufficient to enact a shared environment; it has to be talked about" (Pondy, 1978: 93). An important dimension of the monopoly of naming is the degree of comfort individuals have with the language: " 'Understanding the subtleties' requires knowing the language game you are playing" (Pondy, 1978: 95). Different vocabularies undermine the linguistic performance of the actors in a field and their degree of competence. Individuals thus have

an organizational, professional, and individual interest vested in a meaning.

The power of business plans lies in their monopoly of legitimate naming. They actively construct the seeable and the sayable by specifying what will be documented and what will be ignored. Aspects that are named and categories that are recognized gain legitimacy and importance. Those aspects that are not named or that fall outside the accepted categories lose legitimacy and are ignored. Business plans provide, in Fiol and Huff's (1992) terms, categorization submaps, important dimensions of action, providing the basis for future decisions. In contrast to Fiol and Huff (1992), however, we argue that the categories that are chosen in business planning are important not only for their causal implications but because they directly affect the recognition and definition of capital. Business planning is not limited to a change in the physical activities that constitute work or the labor process. It is part of a process that defines and constructs markets for various forms of capital. Business planning reconstructs what it is that is being produced and for whom and defines the value of the product. In this important but neglected sense, business plans actively contribute to the production of consumers, producers, and products and indicate how these are to be managed. By articulating the rules of exchange within and between fields, this process influences the types of capital recognized as legitimate and helps determine at what rates and in what forms capital will be exchanged.

Business plans not only provide categorization submaps but also influence identity submaps. Because categories of a field are internally related in subtle but powerful ways, business planning reconfigures the producers' sense of identity. Redefining the field's dominant capital may not directly affect actors' intrinsic properties (a curator's knowledge, for example) but it does affect their relational properties (their position), because it affects their overall capital, and therefore their standing in the field. This, in turn, will have implications for an individual's sense of positional identity (Dutton, Dukerich, and Harquail, 1994). Fiol and Huff (1992: 281) claimed that identity submaps are the most difficult to change, because identities are embedded in enduring assumptions, whereas categorization and causal beliefs are subject to change from changing information. We suggest that there is a greater degree of interdependence between submaps. Where identity is understood not only as habitus (gender, class, race, etc.) but also as dependent on the allocations of capital to positions, attempts at redefining capital inevitably have implications for identity, as shown in our analysis of pedagogic processes in the introduction of business planning in the Cultural Facilities and Historical Resources Division.

Business Planning as Pedagogy in Action

In its first budget, the provincial treasurer discussed the creation of a new "management control structure for all departments" (Dinning, 1993: 118). "This fall, . . . each department, agency and organization receiving government funds will be called upon to develop a three year business plan by

January 1994 . . . . These plans will include measures of outcome and performance and strategies to reduce costs. Future funding will be tied to the achievement of those results" (Dinning, 1993: 14–15). Alberta's "New Approach to Government" was not just about planning and performance measurement. It was about *business* planning, and it is in this undefined term that we see pedagogic processes at work. Business planning, designed to incorporate alleged business values (such as economy, efficiency, output orientation, and entrepreneurialism) in a system of accountable planning, is central to this new approach, as is the changing discourse. Thus, the first business plan of the CFHR division stated: "[The division] will focus on the economic contribution of its facilities, programs and services by emphasizing quality, aggressive regional marketing and sound reinvestment in infrastructure. One of the primary goals is to develop regional anchors for national and international tourism, thereby helping to sustain community vitality and prosperity" (Alberta Community Development, 1994: 5). Further, services came to be described as "products," and the aim of the government emphasized "results, results, results." As an Albertan commentator noted, "People all over were reading . . . economic and management theories from the likes of Peter Drucker, Tom Peters, Kenichi Ohmae, Ted Gaebler, and David Osborne, and others" (Lisac, 1995: 43).

The CFHR division, although at the time a field of restricted production, also exists within the larger political and economic field, one that gave rise to the Klein government. Senior division managers described the changes in philosophy and practices emanating from the Klein government as fundamental changes—changes in fact, not in rhetoric. At times they even anticipated (and helped constitute) the changes. And, as Meyer and Rowan (1991: 53) noted, in "institutionally elaborated environments, sagacious conformity is required: Leadership (in a university, hospital, business) requires an understanding of changing fashions and governmental programs." We observed this throughout 1994 as all levels of government struggled to come to terms with the changes that were occurring. During this period, divisional representatives met frequently to attempt to learn how the department was interpreting the actions of the provincial treasurer and to attempt to determine what constituted a successful business plan. Pedagogy worked here as a form of learning through discovery and self-reflection. The CFHR believed that it would have to change the way the managers and people working in these sites viewed themselves, their activities, and the management of the sites to survive this government retrenchment. As one senior divisional manager observed: "We know what we are trying to do. We know what we are trying to accomplish as an organization. We think we know what the government wants us to do. And that is what drives us. We think we know what the government wants us to do. As civil servants . . . we see that as our job. How we get there varies enormously."

The division thus began its own, somewhat independent business planning process for the historical sites and, in late 1993, hired consultants from Alberta's Department of Economic Development and Tourism to conduct a series of five

day-long workshops on business plans and to visit the sites to provide specific advice. Business planning in the CFHR division followed the SWOT design school model, in which organizations conceptualize their environment in terms of opportunities and threats and their own capabilities in terms of strengths and weaknesses (Mintzberg, 1994). Business plans in Bourdieu's terms, are "culturally arbitrary." There is no reason why a business plan should contain certain things and not others. The SWOT model, however, was presented as a legitimated vocabulary, a technical procedure, the way things should be done if business planning was to be done properly. Fiol and Huff (1992: 282) emphasized that "the categories 'threat' and 'opportunity' are important mapping devices influencing the way managers act on issues." For example, other historic sites were now labeled as competitors and threats. Charging entrance fees was seen as an opportunity to create discretionary funds. Symbolic power operates through a process of naming and categorization.

As Mintzberg (1994) suggested, the goals implicit in the use of business planning are forced on an organization that relies on the process. In the CFHR division, business planning has been premised on cultural and historical sites being, if not businesses, organizations that may be likened to businesses. Thus, isomorphism is implicit in this initial step. Described as competitors for a fixed amount of tax payers' leisure, time, and money, cultural and historical sites were asked to identify other organizations in Alberta that attract visitors and encourage spending. West Edmonton Mall, Canada's largest shopping mall, became a point of comparison. Thus, planning in the CFHR followed the pattern described by DiMaggio's (1991: 287) history of art museums in which "unreflective allusions to organizational models from other fields . . . was the object of fateful debate."

Business plans were presented as an integrated hierarchy of ordered and organized actions, a cascade through goals, outcomes, strategies, and performance measures. Emphasis was on content, principally increased gate visitation and revenue generation activities, and strategies for implementation. Planning thus controlled the premises that underlay the decisions, if not the actual decisions themselves (Mintzberg, 1994: 198). Most sites were obliged to engage in this process; those that were not obliged worried about the implications of their exclusion. Although sites are front-line organizations with high performance ambiguity (Smith, 1965) and may be assumed to have a decentralized power structure (Jermier and Berkes, 1979), our view is that the opportunities for loose coupling between actions and talk were minimized, and change was real.

The pedagogic effect of planning was that it was appropriate to expand revenue, increase admissions, introduce new products, or improve the coffee shop. Sites were not encouraged to include plans for collections, research, or restoration. Such plans, where produced, were rejected as irrelevant. Plans that were long and individualized were rejected in favor of simple and abbreviated plans. Thus, mechanisms of transcription (like business plans) were never neutral but involved strict, although unstated rules about what was appropriate. A second reason why these sites, even though

they are front-line organizations, had limited opportunities not to conform to divisional and government pressures was that their plans and performance measures were reported through standardized annual accountability reports.

The business planning process was pedagogical in three ways. First, it required a receptivity to change. By receptivity, Bourdieu (1991) did not mean a welcoming or acceptance, but simply a preparation for change. In this situation, receptivity was invoked by a changing discourse at the provincial level as well as through budget cuts and the rapid pace and unpredictability of change. In a period of destabilization, the very indeterminacy of the business planning exercise was also acutely disorienting. Second, business planning actively involves organizational actors who appear to be creating the process as they go along. The business planning process was very unstructured, although it is unclear whether the lack of instruction at the governmental level was intentional. Some of those interviewed felt it epitomized the new approach—that the process of developing plans could be quite varied and that all that mattered was results. For others, there was a great deal of tension surrounding getting the business plan and the performance measures "right." Frequently, managers remarked on the lack of a blueprint for change and spoke about "feeling their way," an expression that symbolizes managers' attempts to "read" the government's actions specifically and the wider Albertan power structure more generally. In this sense, business planning encouraged managers to try to learn a feel for the new situation and to try to absorb some of the cultural capital to be gained by appearing entrepreneurial. For example, a divisional manager stated: "We wanted to be entrepreneurial and if we wanted to be players in the private sector we were going to have business plans. We were going to operate our facilities like small businesses. So we got small business planners in and we went through that educational process." Managers generally began to use the business planning process to gain legitimacy in the larger environment by using "the language of business." Business plans were also used to signal to lower-level managers and employees that their organizations were changing.

Third, the planning process involved the pedagogy of learning the new official language, and, as Meyer and Rowan (1991) argued, the evolution of organizational language is the most important aspect of isomorphism. As one site manager noted, "It is very important to us to have these business plans be credible with business people . . . it has recently become a good public relations tool with us. It has also allowed us to, you know how your Mama always told you, speak to people in a language that they understand? It is wise to have a common language with people in business. It has also taught some of our people to get out of their own professional jargon and into somebody else's." The meaning of everyday words like "goals" and "objectives" became precarious. The difficulty in remembering a new language and all its categories—goals, objectives, measures, etc.— was expressed several times. As one site manager lamented, "Well, as you are aware, there is a whole field of planning, with all the charts and all the steps. I have tried, I

can't even remember them. I can't even classify them and by background I am a classifier. That is what we do. We are interested in taxonomy and I can't lump these buggers together.'' It was a language that was alien to most personnel: ''Out of [planning] comes the goals, strategies, actions— sorry, goals, objectives, strategies, and actions. And to those we attach measures''(division manager). Some departments presented their completed business plans to the legislature only to be told that what they described as objectives were really goals and that what they defined as outcomes were really processes or outputs.

A significant part of Bourdieu's general argument is that the dualism between the content (e.g., Porter, 1980) and process of business plans (e.g., Pettigrew, 1985; Hart and Banbury, 1994) is often unhelpful in understanding the production and reproduction of social life. In our study, managers were learning and producing strategy in the process of forming strategies. The content of the strategies not only came out of the process, it informed the continuing process. Pedagogy helps us understand how organizational actors make sense of and construct change through both participation and resistance. Meaningful pedagogical exercises cause the capital and positions within a field to shift. These shifts create points of examination at which members of a field are encouraged to examine their existing activities and identities. At such a point, people name and categorize themselves (Bourdieu, 1991). This leads some people to try to remake themselves, while others may stop contributing or withdraw completely. Some, particularly those with curatorial backgrounds, felt uncomfortable and tended to become less involved as they no longer understood the rules of the game; others not only embraced the new field but helped give it shape. These processes are both conscious and preconscious in that they occur as participants recognize in their own language and dispositions that either they fit or do not fit in a field (Bourdieu, 1977).

Business planning was an act of symbolic violence. Through a process of naming, categorizing, and regularizing, business planning replaced one set of meanings, defined by the producers within the field, with another set that was defined in reference to the external market. By doing so, this change threatened the relative autonomy of the field and its cultural and symbolic capital. In concrete terms, it reduced the control that people in the field had over their own work lives. The appearance of business plans as mere acts of technical transcription concealed the force this process involved. In particular, it directed attention away from the shifting of cultural capital toward economic capital and the diminution of existing identities.

FIELDS OF LARGE-SCALE PRODUCTION

The field that emerged from the business planning process has a number of characteristics that parallel Bourdieu's description of fields of large-scale cultural production and that differ significantly from the characteristics of a field of restricted production, as shown in table 1. The focus is no longer on preserving cultural capital but on the ability to quickly translate or convert all forms of capital into economic

capital. This is because the field can no longer depend on internal rules to define its cultural capital and to defend its boundaries. It must depend on outsiders' evaluations of the economic value of its cultural capital. Accountants and economists move in to place an economic value on artifacts, now conceived as "assets," and economic balance sheets become more salient as a management tool (Carnegie and Wolnizer, 1996).

Within this new logic, the currency of its capital is defined by products to be sold to the public without commensurate increases in artifacts to be discovered and preserved. The evaluation of a site is based increasingly on its ability to produce and market successful products to museum "customers." The success of these products is determined by the public's willingness to attend or consume them and, ultimately, to pay for them. Increasingly, the work at the sites is evaluated by its market value and the acceptability of its message to a large-scale audience. Legitimacy lies in the environment, and, as Meyer and Rowan (1991) noted, the adoption of external assessment criteria and employing external criteria of worth are some of the features of isomorphism, which produces legitimacy.

The business plan encouraged a manager to rethink the original site plan in terms of market shares and competitors: "It [the business plan] would help us focus . . . on product development and would give us the guidance in terms

Table 1

Comparison of Fields of Restricted and Large-scale Cultural Production

	Field of Restricted Production	Field of Large-scale Production
Orientation between capital and field		
Dominant capital	Cultural	Economic
Orientation of field	Definition of capital and distribution of positions is based on rules internal to the field.	Definition of capital and distribution of positions more dependent on rules external to the field.
Function of management	Focused on preservation of cultural capital. Accomplished through facility and exhibition planning based on professional interpretation of the necessities of history and culture.	Focused on ease and speed of convertibility of cultural to economic capital. Accomplished through business planning and performance monitoring.
Organizational identity	Cultural/historical site capable of preserving and generating cultural capital.	Small business capable of generating economic capital.
Product	Collection, preservation, study, interpretation, and exhibition of artifact.	Products for revenue generation.
Positions within the field		
Professional identity	Curator, researcher, interpreter, educator, historian accountable to artifact and profession.	Entrepreneur, accountable to the bottom line.
Orientation	Internal: Based on professional standards. Able to define and educate appropriate consumers.	External: Dependent on finding and attracting consumers who are willing to pay.
Criteria for evaluation	Aesthetic, historical and representational faithfulness.	Visitor counts and admission fees; entertainment value.

where some of our competitors are going to have to go through the process. It would help us formulate any future directions, capital initiatives as we go through looking at who is in the market place, what is happening, what can we realistically afford, and how potential change can be built into, or how we need to modify the position statement, or the goals that we have in terms of heritage preservation in terms of issues." Organizational purpose has become more focused on revenue generation. Often when interviewed about planning in a generic sense, without reference to business plans or site plans, managers focused on their plans to increase revenue or to introduce new products for "target markets," rather than the elaborate site plans. Although some managers differentiated between educational and interpretive activities (programs) and T-shirts, gifts, and postcards (products), many managers described any identifiable activity that was provided by the site as a product.

Management now centers around a process named "business planning." Increasingly, site managers suggested that only by articulating missions, goals, objectives, and strategies would their organization stand a chance of success. Further, missions, goals, and objectives were not enough. In addition, the organization had to specify beforehand the visible and measurable outcomes it intended to achieve and provide evidence that it had achieved these outcomes. As outcomes were defined by revenue generation, evidence required proof that the sites were producing products that would translate into economic capital, for example, increased admissions and gift shop sales. Evaluation was no longer to be seen as an afterthought of a process, it was considered necessary and integral to the success of the whole planning process. In this sense, accountability becomes defined as representational faithfulness to the business plan and specified outcomes; management, as meeting the pressing needs of the market by successfully carrying out the business plan.

Whereas the primary value of museum work was viewed as intrinsic to the objects or artifacts museums collected, in the field of large-scale production, the value of their work must be imparted to an object through its economic value. Further, evaluation within the field takes the form of relatively continuous self-reporting of formally established outcomes and performance measures: consumer surveys, attendance figures, revenue generation, and measures of local economic impact. The ability to generate revenues, no matter how small in proportion to overall funding, has now become a source of symbolic capital. Even these sums provide valuable discretionary or "soft" money to site managers. But what is also systematically occurring, in Bourdieu's words, is that the field is increasingly defined "by an intuitive representation of the expectations of the widest possible public" (1993: 127).

Within this new logic, people in the organizations are encouraged to see themselves, perhaps for the first time, as working in businesses rather than working in museums that are run in a businesslike manner. The desirable positional identity is no longer solely curator, researcher, interpreter, or educator. It is also entrepreneur, often described as being "realistic" and becoming "change-agents" and "risk-takers."

Two division managers articulated this change in the following ways:

Because what it [business planning] has done is changed mindsets, it has changed attitudes, it has got people thinking in an entrepreneurial fashion, it has got people actually coming up with business opportunities.

Well, it has helped bring out a lot of the innovations. It sure as hell wasn't [us] who sat down and thought of all of the different ways to make money and to save money and to do things differently. And that is the other thing that it has done, is sort of by highlighting it [revenue] as a priority and providing a venue for those discussions, then that is where most of those things started to come out. [X] is the best example. I mean, nobody heard a peep from [a specific institution] about making money until we started this whole thing and then along [X] comes and . . . out-entrepreneurs Ross Perot.

The field of large-scale production appeared, disappeared, and reappeared in the material we explored. Often the new logic would be both embraced and repudiated by the same respondents. Thus, table 1 presents ideal types that are neither stable nor neatly articulated in practice. For example, one site manager discussed his struggle to decide what performance measures he should document:

This is one area that I want to look at so that we have more information in that area—the knowledge change of a participant. I don't know how one would measure that, but it is important to think that if it is in a historical *business* [our emphasis] and we want to share or interpret the history in a meaningful way to the visitor that there is some either greater appreciation of a point of history or that there is an increase in knowledge of fact of history being accomplished. Beside the strictly entertainment factor (there is nothing wrong with measuring the entertainment factor) that they went away with a smile on their face and a fun time and telling six others that it is a great place to visit. It is part of our agenda in terms of increasing gate visitation.

A divisional manager discussed the ambiguity many felt about the changing organizational emphasis:

It is certainly a concern internally about maintaining historic integrity and maintaining, I mean we are a mission-driven organization, but we are now having to take a market driven—and I think there is some concern that we are now being market driven. And I think it varies from person to person in terms of what they are comfortable with. I mean, . . . if there is mission and market and we are somewhere in the middle and I think some people would prefer us closer to mission and others are saying we want market, and let us loose.

As a result of these processes and the overwhelming acceptance throughout Alberta of the generic market logic (the logic of large-scale production), the division itself abandoned or reduced its attempts to protect the boundaries that allowed the field to be self-referencing. The shift toward large-scale production has eroded the existing autonomy of the field because it now has to operate in a large-scale market. It must now compete with Disneyland, local festivals, movies, and video games. Museums and historical sites find themselves referencing a wide field in which they are very small players. Equally significantly, these shifts may have resulted in an absolute loss of cultural and symbolic capital. An absolute loss of capital can result from incessant criticism arising from outside a restricted field, as well as from

inside the field. In our study, this criticism was experienced both directly, as general criticisms of the public sector, and indirectly, as the business plans limited the ability of museums and cultural sites to exhibit and protect their cultural capital. Importantly, these shifts result from practices like the imposition of business planning and performance measurement systems, which undermine existing linguistic and discursive competencies and force their replacement with a language that changes the hierarchical ordering of positions within the field and between fields. Guillory (1993), who studied changes in universities, used the term "capital flight" to describe a similar shift. Further, he noted that once a field's capital begins to be diminished, the process of capital flight is accelerated. Thus capital flight becomes not only the result of these shifts but a cause of further capital erosion.

CAPITAL AND FIELDS OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION: THE ROLE OF STRATEGIC ACTION AND CONTROL

Institutional theory, particularly its portrayal of coercive isomorphism, has raised questions over the concept of agency it implies (Oliver, 1991). It is ambiguous whether organizations react to change strategically, i.e., consciously select which aspects of the institutional environment require a response and to what degree they will respond (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995), or whether changes in appearance are adopted without much conscious strategic action because they are so taken for granted (Zucker, 1987). As a result, there has been renewed interest in agency and interests in institutional theory (Oliver, 1991; Goldstein, 1994). As Goodrick and Salancik (1996: 25) argued, there is a need to explore "the constraint under which strategic choice is exercised."

In our study, seemingly technical practices such as business planning involve strategic or conscious efforts to manage environmental threats, while at the same time involving non-strategic changes to the field, capital, and identity through symbolic violence. A dramatic example of the effect of symbolic violence can be seen in the World Heritage site that focuses on Blackfoot history. The Head Smashed in Buffalo Jump site was originally designed to present aspects of Native-American spirituality, but our native guide indicated that what now filled him most with pride was the demonstration of his people's historical entrepreneurialism in using all the parts of the killed buffalo and in showing the extensive organizational abilities in coordinating the killing of vast herds of buffalo. In general, what the business planning process influences is the understanding that all Albertans have of their history and culture; the past is re-created as a series of small business ventures. While business planning implies the importance of strategic action, making events appear manageable and somewhat predictable (thus constructing agency), business planning is powerful precisely because the symbolic violence involved remains unidentified, unacknowledged, and, to a large extent, outside of the control of managers within the field. This dual sense that changes are strategic yet remain unrecognized is reflected in one site manager's description of the change in identities that would

be required in the new field: "You have to have a certain amount of chutzpa, you have to have a certain cockiness and whatever to succeed as a business person. . . . Try to find, try to encourage that, you know. Say, 'Now be arrogant, be cocky, think that you can win all of the time. Oh do something!' . . . It is not that you are starting at point zero, you are starting back from point zero to create people, not to create successes but to create the people who will go out and find those successes." While this quotation suggests that the effort to change subordinates' identities was part of a conscious decision, the manager did not acknowledge the implications of these changes in re-creating people for the capital of the field as a whole.

The concept of symbolic violence has been criticized for an implied determinism (Calhoun, 1995). Bourdieu (1985: 728) stated, however, that although "objects of the social world can be perceived and uttered in different ways they always include a degree of indeterminacy and fuzziness. This element of play, of uncertainty is what provides the basis for a plurality of world views and to all the symbolic struggles for the power to produce and impose the legitimate world-view." Individuals or groups may collectively strategize to obtain or create important positions, but, for Bourdieu, strategies are not rational calculative decisions. The existence, form, and direction of change depends both on the state of the system, i.e., the "repertoire of possibilities which it offers," and on "the balance of forces between social agents who have entirely real interests in the different possibilities available to them" (Bourdieu, 1993: 34). The ability of agents to "un-make" or "re-make" the social world depends on "realistic knowledge of what it is and what they can do with it from the position they occupy within it" (Bourdieu, 1985: 734). This suggests that agents within organizations mount strategies that reflect neither pure agency nor completely structured responses.[5]

The division's enthusiasm for business planning began as a conscious effort to meet the government's expectations and to set the division apart from other divisions by appearing proactive, i.e., it began as a consciously defensive strategy (cf. Oliver, 1991). Divisional managers felt that the division had to position itself well and used business planning to do this. Some managers publicly embraced this new vision, frustrated that they had not been given enough independence or the opportunity to be entrepreneurial in the past. But, for many, being entrepreneurial is no longer an act of defensive camouflage, it is an ideal way to be. In this sense, the pedagogy of business planning has resulted in a process of transformation.

For most managers, however, reactions to the changes taking place were mediated by their understanding of the field of museums and cultural sites. They were proud of their link to scholarship, exploration, and the history associated with culturally valued resources. They were also conscious that the distribution and types of cultural capital in Alberta were shifting to value enterprise, the marketplace, risk taking, and individual initiative. Pedagogic effects are layered upon a producer's identity (Jenkins, 1992), and the changes can thus be seen as a form of sedimentation, rather than a sweeping

[5]
The problematic duality between individuals and fields, agency and structure, has been a central concern in Bourdieu's work and a central issue in our research. These issues remain somewhat unresolved in Bourdieu's research, according to some critics (Jenkins, 1992), and issues of the ability of people to resist the type of public sector reform that we document remains a central political concern (Broadbent, Laughlin, and Read, 1991; Power and Laughlin, 1992, 1996).

away of former understandings of the field (Cooper et al., 1996). These effects were produced through the creative ways that division managers attempted to justify the changes they were implementing and to limit the loss of cultural capital. In some cases, managers believed that the new market focus would create museums that were more open, more approachable, and less elitist. They described targeting exhibits to underrepresented groups of the population, e.g., women or adults without children. Museum directors were not concerned about these groups because they are underrepresented, but because market research has shown that underrepresented groups were less likely to visit the site or museum and, as a result, less likely to pay the admission fee, eat in the cafeteria, or purchase items in the gift shop. Underrepresented groups matter now because they may represent a source of revenue (economic capital) rather than a source of cultural capital.

Focusing on markets has also led managers to ask how they can make their exhibits flashier, more interactive, and more accessible to groups with younger demographics and more disposable income. Some managers suggest that individual curators, archivists, and interpreters have been able to showcase or market their area of expertise. This has allowed them to share subject material they care about deeply with a wider public. One site manager described it this way:

We feel a loss of the traditional position, image, resource base that museums used to be recognized by in society. Now, given the assumption that this might be a cyclical phenomena, and there are many things that we could do here. Given the environment that we find ourselves in, we use the big [exhibits] out front. I call it gimmickry to the extent that they are non-traditional . . . . It is very much theater, it is theater, props. Not a museum quality show. I don't know, but the total effect of the show seems to be quite effective. I haven't thought that one through clearly yet but it seems to work. We are using those as much as possible to try to turn people on to the richer meaning and to a large degree we have succeeded . . . . We have had some really run away shows and a lot of people come to see the shows, and a lot of people come to see the show who would not come to see a museum.

At times, managers appeared to use their business plans strategically, as a conscious attempt to protect the cultural capital of the field. For example, this same site manager continued:

Right now, in some instances, we are trying to make some things less visible. The public climate, the political climate is such . . . everybody is happy and it is this great place to go to and the budget is being cut to shit without tax increases. We don't forsake the back area. It is our strength. And we take the plans that we generate on the back area as much as possible. Other museums are following a very different course. They are starting to forsake the back areas, extensively. Get rid of collections. Shut programs down. The second you do that you might as well get rid of most of your staff because the staff that you have are museum staff, not exhibit centers or display center staff. They are museum staff. Museum staff, collections, etc. That is the core of what it is. That is what you draw everything else from and if that isn't healthy none of the rest will be healthy. You can do it but you had better have a whole bunch of people who are exhibit center people. They don't care about collections. They worry about programs and bringing people in. They don't see the continuum of collections, and research, and interpretation . . . we don't emphasize it. We downplay it.

The underlying sense of this quotation is that the cultural capital of the field is being undermined by a political climate, and those who have traditionally been valued for their specialized knowledge about history, museums, and artifacts find they occupy a less important place than those who bring knowledge about marketing, promotions, and retail activities. In addition, the core activities of a museum are no longer a source of cultural or social capital but are, instead, something to hide. Rather than using strategies of resistance, decoupling, or ceremonial change, the managers of the division wished to engage conscientiously with the introduction of the required changes. Divisional management embraced the dominating field to protect its economic and social capital through the introduction of business planning, but as it was doing this, it was simultaneously undermining its cultural capital through the activities adopted to protect it. As Brint and Karabel (1991: 352) noted, "organizational change derives from efforts to conform to categories and practices that give classificatory meaning to the social world." These changes are not cosmetic, but pedagogic, with change achieved through the learning process.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In the past, the CFHR division used elements of the logic of large-scale production, consciously and somewhat instrumentally, to defend and expand its field; what managers referred to as the core of backstage operations, such as curatorial, research, historical, and archeological activities. Their actions exemplified the symbolic displays and loose coupling suggested by institutional theory. Business planning, however, involved a more substantial, less strategic, and less conscious transformation of the entire field, toward large-scale production. It signaled not only the increasing translation of cultural capital into economic capital but also the absolute attrition of cultural capital, the field's primary form of capital. Business planning was much more than a symbolic and defensive exercise. In Bourdieu's terms, the planning process was pedagogical in that it fundamentally changed the allocation of capital to positions within the field and thus changed the valued positions within the CFHR division. The attrition of the field's traditional cultural capital leaves the division and its members increasingly vulnerable to further external challenges in the name of economic capital.

The use of business planning illustrates the importance and power of language for issues of control, particularly the power to consecrate linguistic and discursive competencies, i.e., the ability to create categorization submaps and specify the form and structure of decision processes. The provincial government and divisional managers illustrated their power to do this naming directly, by requiring business plans, and indirectly, by rejecting plans that did not fit an unspecified version of the correct, implicit template. While Bourdieu noted that we "create the world through naming" (1991: 105), he further pointed out that those in dominant fields or positions seldom speak or sanctify the language of the dominated unless it is an act of condescension that reinforces the social distance between positions. Symbolic violence occurs because dominant discourses (in our case, the language of

rationalistic planning and entrepreneurialism), in displacing other forms of expression, induce "the holders of dominated linguistic competencies to collaborate in the destruction of their instruments of expression" (Bourdieu, 1991: 49). As with many other episodes of discursive consecration, business planning appears to be a neutral planning device that is available to anyone for any purpose. This appearance leads to a misrecognition of how these plans served as pedagogy, i.e., how they introduced a hidden curriculum into the field and involved participants in activities that undermined their own capital. In this sense, the introduction of business plans can be considered symbolic violence and the control achieved through planning is a result of the process of naming and the choice of permissible (and legitimate) language.

Moreover, control was achieved by pedagogic exclusion because the time managers spent meeting with their staffs to create and revise business plans was seen as time that was not available for other activities. Managers also reported spending more time organizing exhibits, cafeterias, and revenue-generating activity to fulfil the new goals and less time on meeting the site plan's objectives and dealing with artifacts. For some sites, particularly the smaller ones, this process seemed to create insecurity and anxiety, but all managers recognized that the emphasis on business activities and the creation of products was changing the way the institutions functioned. Some managers talked about inherent conflicts between identifying and defending the "intrinsic value" of the artifact and positioning artifacts (historically, spatially, and culturally) to appeal to the general public. Other managers were both enthusiastic about the changes and convinced that the division could be more entrepreneurial while preserving its core function. What was not explicitly discussed was that participating in the business planning process was undermining the ability of the division and the sites (as a field of restricted production) to distinguish themselves from business and, therefore, to justify continued public funding and considerable autonomy. The business planning process was misrecognized by participants and undermined the department's ability to preserve its capital, which had been predominantly social and cultural.

A crucial issue is whether the government has controlled what happened at the CFHR through the planning process or whether the division is appearing to embrace the emphasis on economic markets while maintaining its commitment to the artifact and to history. Bourdieu's concept of fields as locations of struggle and conflict suggests that there is unlikely to be a simple resolution of this issue. Our study suggests, however, that the shift to large-scale production is significant precisely because managers seem to feel compelled or obligated to participate in the business planning process. They are drawn in to focus on the categories of the business plan and thereby to change their identities as producers and to undermine the distinction that is the basis of their cultural capital. It is in this sense that business planning exerts control in the form of symbolic violence.

By focusing on fields, capital, and pedagogy we have shown how Bourdieu's concepts can enrich institutional theory. Using Bourdieu's concept of field, we can recognize that rather

than the organization-environment dichotomy that is still pervasive in institutional theory, there are multiple, hierarchically structured fields. We focused on change within and between fields rather than on the impact of an institutional environment on an organization. Within each field there are elements that are unreflective, routine, or taken for granted. Examining the unreflected in fields, the taken for granted elements of either restricted or large-scale production, allowed us to understand how the logic of fields may become contested and to examine how different logics challenge one another (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Townley, 1997). As Berger and Luckmann (1967: 44) argued, taken for granted is not an atemporal concept—something is taken for granted "until further notice." While we have portrayed change as coming from the dominating field of changes within the political and economic fields of Alberta, this is not to assume that fields are stable and that change is only exogenous (Leblebici et al., 1991) or precipitated by shock (Fligstein, 1991). Fields are in a constant state of flux. The field of cultural and historic sites was not unstable because it was ill-formed, nor did its ability to resist and the extent of resistance depend on its degree of institutionalization (Zucker, 1991). Museums and cultural and historic sites have a long pedigree (Bennett, 1988; Sherman and Rogoff, 1994). Rather, the important factor was the conflicting capitals at stake. The "success" of a field of restricted production relies on a logic of confidence and good faith (Meyer and Rowan, 1991). This becomes vulnerable when the ease of translation to economic capital is privileged and more highly valued.

We have placed a lot of explanatory weight on capital, but its amplification of the concept of field in institutional theory allows us to consider the political dimensions of institutional change. Capital illustrates what is at stake. Whereas in institutional theory, organizations may adopt different practices or structures while protecting their core identity, we have shown that the act of adopting these practices or structures may significantly influence the capital and identity of the field. In Albert and Whetten's (1985) terms, it affects what can be claimed as central, distinctive, and the basis of continuity for an organization. What is seen as core is itself problematic and open for strategic action. In our case, business planning introduced cultural and historical sites into a field of large-scale production and, as cultural sites became measured by the bottom line and lost their ability to differentiate themselves from Disneyland, increased the homogenization of organizations. It became increasingly difficult to say that the preservation of a dinosaur was more important or more part of the core of the organization than, for example, expanding the cafeteria or gift shop. For those in the field, this can mean that they increasingly lose control over the pace, definition, and ability to define their work.

Management practices are regarded as common across organizations. We live in the age of the generalist manager, skilled in the ways of the economic market. Economists, accountants, and marketing people seem likely to take over from curators, archeologists, and scientists in the management of cultural facilities and historical sites. Parallel developments in the colonization of health care are also taking

place, with the language of costs and benefits, the hospital as factory and patients as product lines creating a new field of health care (Ashmore, Mulkay, and Pinch, 1988). Homogenization also means that the sites and those who work in them are increasingly unprotected from market pressures in the larger economy. It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that an emphasis on business planning, marketing, and revenue generation is associated with increased prominence given to local business groups in the management of the sites we studied. Thus, "friends" organizations have taken on a new significance, raising funds and collecting entrance fees, with millions of dollars now moving through these groups, outside the formal control of the Provincial Treasury or even the site manager. The friends organizations now have considerable influence in determining how the money they raise will be spent.

It is important to emphasize, however, that we are not advocating nostalgia for a golden age of museums untarnished by commercialism. There are aspects of a field of restricted production that may be elitist and exclusionary (Fowler, 1994; Alexander, 1996). There may be a need for public involvement in the use of public money for public facilities. And, as we have noted, some of the changes have drawn groups to museums who might not otherwise have come. Nor were managers opposed to the money this introduced, if it meant increased spending on sites and better exhibits. Some managers feel that their status as entrepreneurs (not civil servants) has increased, as has their autonomy. Equally, we do not comment on whether the changes adopted improve organizational functioning and efficiency. Rather, our argument is that when changes affect the capital of a field, they redefine the field, and this has significant implications for the work lives of those employed in these facilities and for what will count as valued history in the future.

A question remains about the ease of operationalizing Bourdieu's work for future research. Certainly this is not the first or the only field, in Alberta or elsewhere, to have shifted from a field of restricted production to one of large-scale production, but the effect and meaning of such a shift is always locally specific. We can only understand issues of institutional change and control by examining pedagogy and capital within a specific location or field. For example, Laughlin and Broadbent (1995) argued that the new public management in the U.K. has been more successfully resisted by doctors than school teachers for reasons related to their location in the field of professions. Changes in the field of museums and cultural sites resulted from changes in the larger field of Alberta economics and politics and reflects the efforts of the CFHR division to read and respond to these external shifts. We interpret these as being effected by the pedagogy of business planning, but we should not forget the coercive nature of the employment and budget cuts. The strategies and effects that we studied cannot be predicted directly from the reorganization of Alberta government, nor can the effects of the reorganization be understood without appreciating the specifics of the field of museums and cultural sites. Although the specific changes and outcomes of this shift will always reflect the local conditions, shifts from fields

of restricted production to fields of large-scale production will share certain features, because fields have certain elements in common (capital and positions of possibility). Bourdieu's understanding of fields suggests that similar issues of pedagogy, capital, and change may arise in all locations because fields are homologous in many important respects, and they all involve maneuverings over positions and capital. Bourdieu's work does not provide specific guidance on which field characteristics might be global and which might be local (Calhoun, 1993). Exploring the links between the global and local requires further research (Giddens, 1991). In addition, because Bourdieu's work offers a very complex understanding of cause and effect, in which external threats are highly mediated by the structure and capital of particular fields, drawing easily generalizable conclusions from the study of one field is difficult, and Bourdieu's work has been criticized for this (Jenkins, 1992; Wacquant, 1993). Yet, as Silverman (1993) showed, it is possible to develop generalizations from single cases, and indeed, this is a characteristic of Bourdieu's own work.

Two related issues here are the degree of permanence of the shift from restricted to large-scale production and whether it is possible to make any statements regarding possible global shifts in this direction. Calhoun (1995: 139) argued that "a high degree of convertibility is . . . characteristic especially of relatively complex, market based and above all capitalist societies." While we cannot determine the direct relevance of this experience in the Albertan government for similar exercises in administrative reform in other Canadian jurisdictions (Savoie, 1994) or elsewhere—e.g., the Gore-Clinton attempts at reforming the U.S. federal government administration (Gore, 1993), Australian attempts at introducing "rationalism" in Canberra (Pusey, 1991), and U.K. reforms, loosely connected to Thatcher (Pollitt, 1993)—our analysis can be seen as a contribution to the analysis of modern government (March and Olson, 1983; Miller and Rose, 1990). We have examined the new public management in action and how private and public sector values intertwine and are given shape in reform processes (Czarniawska, 1985). There may be shifts toward and away from the field of large-scale production, but the symbolic violence of the business planning process permanently changes the identity of producers and the capital of the field. The power of pedagogy lies in actors' complicity in their own control, not only changing themselves but also what is valued in the field in which they operate.

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